The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are increasingly rewarding loyal armed groups on the ground, further complicating the country’s civil war. In June, the Sudanese Armed Forces appointed Prime Minister Kamil Idris to lead the civilian cabinet in Port Sudan, but Gebreil Ibrahim and Mini Arko Minawi, leaders of two powerful armed groups from Darfur, refused to leave their posts.
Army leader Abdelfattah al-Burhan overruled Idris, allowing Ibrahim and Minawi to maintain control over ministries that generate government revenue. “Burhan’s concession to Ibrahim and Minawi allows them to keep ministries that control [government] revenue,” said Suliman Baldo, founder of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker.
The RSF has formed an alliance with smaller armed factions, declaring its intention to form a parallel government representing all of Sudan. Analysts say both the SAF and RSF are trying to meet the demands of powerful militias to keep their battlefield alliances intact. The RSF has already unveiled its leadership council, featuring leaders of armed groups in prominent positions. A future parallel government seems imminent, with the RSF announcing an alliance with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), an armed group from the Nuba Mountains led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu.
This alliance has sparked concerns about the legitimacy of the RSF’s intentions. “They do not want to go into any kind of mediation as a rebel group. They want to be seen as a government [to boost their legitimacy],” said Kholood Khair, Sudan expert and founder of Confluence Advisory think tank. Tasis, the new alliance, portrays itself as the cornerstone of a “New Sudan” seeking to protect historically neglected communities. However, Hamid Khalafallah, an expert on Sudan, disagrees, saying, “This is just a group formed out of war dynamics despite their entire narrative of it being a coalition of the marginalised.”
The war has displaced millions of Sudanese people, with over four million fleeing to neighboring countries since April 2023. The army-backed government and the RSF-backed alliance are both beholden to armed actors, which could lead to more local commanders expanding recruitment and acquiring weapons to gain political power. “What this whole war has shown is if you pick up a gun, then you can get power,” Khair said. “The RSF are really the poster children for this model.”
Analysts warn that the war may lead to a militia state with a war economy. Mohamed “al-Jakomi” Seid Ahmed, an army-aligned commander, plans to train 50,000 men in Eritrea to protect Sudan’s Northern State from the RSF. Abu Aqla Keikel, who defected from the RSF to the army, has been instrumental in recapturing Gezira state, but Human Rights Watch and Al Jazeera have reported atrocities committed by his fighters. “These are individuals who can hold the army hostage through their autonomous militias … as a way to secure seats around the cake when it is divided,” Baldo said.
The army-backed government will likely create new positions to reward armed actors, but neither side can sustain this strategy indefinitely. The war has depleted the army’s revenue, and Hemedti’s family is unlikely to cede their private wealth to pay recruits.
As loot runs dry, militias may resort to setting up checkpoints, heavily taxing people and goods. “The new predatory behaviour, supported by the state in RSF and army areas, will be checkpoints. And these checkpoints will mark one rebel leader’s area from another,” Khair warned. “In a decade’s time, it may eventually be difficult to tell which militia is loyal to the army and which is loyal to the RSF”.